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ABSTRACT	   Internal	  social	  change	  in	  Turkey,	   inaugurated	  by	  the	  liberalization	  
of	  the	  economy	  in	  the	  1980s	  and	  given	  a	  new	  impetus	  by	  Turkey’s	  EU	  accession	  
path	   during	   the	   AKP	   governments,	   has	   engineered	   a	   momentous	   reform	  
process,	  which	  marks	  the	  beginning	  of	  a	  new	  post-­‐Kemalist	  era	  in	  the	  country.	  
Steady	  economic	  growth,	  along	  with	  democratization,	  brings	  new	  social	  forces	  
to	   the	   forefront	   of	   the	   political	   arena	   and	   makes	   them	   stakeholders	   in	   the	  
policymaking	   processes.	   As	   a	   result,	   one	   can	   observe	   a	   substantive	   shift	   in	  
Turkey’s	   foreign	   policy,	   from	   the	   “hard	   power”	   model	   of	   the	   Kemalist	   era	  
governed	   by	   the	   siege	   syndrome,	   to	   the	   “soft	   power”	   approach	   of	   Ahmet	  
Davutoğlu’s	  doctrine	  of	  “nil	  problems	  with	  neighbors”,	  governed	  by	  a	  feeling	  of	  
confidence	  that	  liberates	  the	  country	  from	  past	  obsessions.	  This	  foreign	  policy	  
shift	   removes	   the	  Cyprus	  problem	   from	   the	   sphere	  of	   the	  untouchable	  grand	  
national	   issues	   as	   well	   as	   from	   its	   historical	   context,	   and	   leads	   to	   a	  
rationalization	   that	   allows	   for	   a	   compromise	  win-­‐win	   settlement.	  Within	   this	  
framework,	  Turkish	  Prime	  Minister	  Erdoğan,	  having	  won	  a	  new	  mandate	  with	  a	  
larger	  ever-­‐popular	  support,	  has	  a	  free	  hand	  to	  take	  the	  initiative	  for	  a	  lasting	  
settlement	   of	   the	   protracted	   Cyprus	   conflict.	   The	   practical	   recommendations	  
made	   in	   this	   regard	   constitute	   substantive	   political	   actions,	   which,	   if	  
materialized,	  would	  decisively	  contribute	  towards	  an	  early	  settlement.	  
	  
*	  This	  paper	  is	  based	  on	  Mr.	  Chrysostomos	  Pericleous	  speech	  at	  the	  10th	  Round	  of	  the	  Heybeliada	  Talks,	  
i.e.	  series	  of	  second-­‐track	  diplomacy	  meetings,	  organized	  by	  GPoT	  Center	  in	  the	  Buffer	  Zone	  in	  Cyprus	  
on	   June	   13,	   2011.	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   to	   the	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   of	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   reconciliation,	   and	  
consensus	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  been	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  to	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  diverse	  views	  and	  thought-­‐provoking	  opinions	  to	  wider	  
public	  and	  is	  pleased	  to	  bring	  to	  you	  a	  paper	  from	  the	  pen	  of	  Mr.	  Pericleous.	  
	  	  
	  


































The	   ascent	   of	   the	   AKP	   to	   power	   in	  
November	   2002	   marked	   the	  
beginning	   of	   a	   post-­‐Kemalist	   era	   in	  
Turkey.	   This	   process,	   the	   very	   first	  
seeds	  of	  which	  were	  sown	  by	  Turgut	  
Özal	   in	   the	   1980s,	   was,	   to	   a	   large	  
extent,	   a	   bottom-­‐up	   process,	  
involving	  a	  deep	  rooted	  demand	  for	  
change	  by	  large	  segments	  of	  society	  
throughout	   the	   country.	   Kemalism,	  
having	   started	   as	   a	   progressive	   –
though	   top-­‐down	   and	   elitist	   –	  
movement	   for	   change,	   was	   turned	  
by	   the	   1970s	   into	   an	   authoritarian	  
conservative	   establishment,	   alien-­‐
ated	   from	   society	   at	   large,	   and	  
incapable	   of	   keeping	   pace	  with	   the	  
era	  of	  globalization.	  	  	  
It	   has	   been	   said	   that	   the	   EU	  
accession	   process	   has	   been	   the	  
locomotive	   for	   social	   and	   political	  
reform	   in	   Turkey.1	   However,	   there	  
has	   been	   a	   genuine	   internal	   social	  
drive,	   which	   made	   the	   reform	  
process	   possible,	   and	   which	   has	  
gained	   a	   renewed	   dynamic	   during	  
the	   last	  decade.	  This	  dynamic	  social	  
drive,	   though	   a	   complex	   process	  
relating	   to	   tradition	   and	   inner	  
spiritual	   life	   as	  well,	   has	   to	  be	   seen	  
mainly	   as	   the	   result	   of	   the	  
liberalization	   of	   Turkish	   economy,	  
which	   was	   inaugurated	   by	   Turgut	  
Özal	  in	  the	  1980s	  and	  later	  made	  big	  
strides	   during	   the	   years	   of	   the	   AKP	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Hugh	   Pope:	   Solving	   the	   EU-­‐Turkey-­‐Cyprus	  
Triangle,	  International	  Crisis	  Group,	  9	  June	  2011.  
governments.2	   The	   entrepreneurial	  
middle	   class	   that	   has	   gradually	  
emerged,	  along	  with	  growing	  in	  size	  
and	   broadening	   its	   boundaries	   to	  
include	  intellectuals,	  journalists,	  and	  
civil	  society	  activists,	  now	  assumes	  a	  
more	   powerful	   political	   leverage	  
and	   creates	   social	   consensus	   for	  
reform.	  
	  
Internal	   Reform	   and	   Foreign	  
Policy	   Shift	   towards	   “Soft	  
Power”3	  	  
For	   the	  purpose	  of	   this	  paper,	   I	  will	  
focus	   on	   two	   main	   aspects	   of	   the	  
reform	  process	  being	  engineered	   in	  
Turkey.	  First,	  the	  institutional	  demo-­‐
cratization	  process	  and,	  second,	  the	  
foreign	   policy	   shift	   from	   the	   “hard	  
power”	  approach	  dominant	  until	  the	  
close	   of	   the	   20th	   century,	   to	   the	  
transparent	   “soft	   power”	   approach	  
of	   Davutoğlu’s	   doctrine	   of	   “nil	  
problems	  with	  neighbors”.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2  See:	  M.	  Hakan	  Yavuz:	  Islamic	  Political	  Identity	  in	  
Turkey,	   OUP,	   2003;	   Sia	   Anagnostopoulou:	  
Τουρκικός	   Εκσυγχρονισμός	   (Turkish	  
Modernization),	   Vivliorama,	   2004;	   Yildiz	   Atasoy:	  
Turkey,	   Islamists	   and	  Democracy,	   I.B.Tauris,	   2005;	  
Hans-­‐Lukas	   Kieser	   (ed):	   Turkey	   Beyond	  
Nationalism,	   I.B.Tauris,	   2006;	   Ali	   Carkoglu	  &	   Ersin	  
Kalaycioglu:	   Turkish	   Democracy	   today,	   I.B.Tauris,	  
2007.	  
3	   See:	   Joseph	   Nye:	   Soft	   Power:	   The	   Means	   to	  





































Democratization	   and	  modernization	  
of	   the	   state	   is	   a	   prerequisite	   for	  
effective	   entrepreneurial	   activity.	  
Moreover,	   it	   is	   a	   precondition	   for	  
social	  mobility	  and	  the	  development	  
of	  civil	  society	  networks.	  This	  brings	  
the	  citizens	  to	  the	  forefront	  of	  social	  
and	   political	   developments	   and	  
turns	  them	  into	  active	  players	  in	  the	  
policy-­‐making	   processes.	   The	   rapid	  
development	   of	   think	   tanks,	   social	  
research,	   and	   information	   society,	  
reflects	  exactly	  the	  upgraded	  role	  of	  
the	  citizenry	  vis-­‐à-­‐vis	  the	  state	  in	  the	  
formulation	   of	  
policies.4	  Whereas,	  
under	  the	  Kemalist	  
regime,	  the	  people	  
existed	   to	   serve	  
the	   state,	   nowa-­‐
days	   priorities	   are	  
shifting	   towards	  
the	   fundamental	  
European	   demo-­‐
cratic	  axiom	  where	  
the	   state	   exists	   to	  
serve	  the	  people.	  	  
While	   social	   mobi-­‐
lity	  and	  a	  minimum	  
of	   social	   consensus	   are	   necessary	  
requirements	   for	   economic	  
development,	   export	   oriented	  
growth	   –	   which	   is	   the	   case	   for	  
Turkey	   –	   needs	   also	   peaceful	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 Among	   other	   sources,	   see	   particularly:	   Maria	  
Ververidou:	   Τουρκία:	   Παράγοντες	   Διαμόρφωσης	  
Πολιτικής	   (Turkey:	   Actors	   in	   Policy-­‐Making	  
Processes),	   in	   Sotiris	   Dalis	   (ed):	   Από	   τον	   Μπους	  
στον	   Ομπάμα	   (From	   Bush	   to	   Obama),	   Papazisis,	  
2010.	  	  
relations	  with	  neighboring	  countries	  
as	  well	  as	  peace	  and	  stability	   in	  the	  
surrounding	   geographical	   and	   trade	  
environment.	  	  
This	   last	   parameter	   adds	   new	  
players	   to	   the	   foreign	   policy	  
decision-­‐making	   processes.	  
Whereas,	   during	   the	   authoritarian	  
state,	   foreign	  policy	  was	   exclusively	  
determined	   behind	   closed	   doors	   by	  
the	   National	   Security	   Council	   and	  
the	   diplomatic	   bureaucracy,	   now	  
the	   major	   role	   has	   shifted	   towards	  
the	   political	  
government	   and	  
the	   social	   actors	  
who	   try	   to	  
promote	   their	  
interests	   through	  
foreign	   relations.	  
This	   makes	   foreign	  
policy-­‐making	   a	  
more	   transparent	  
and	   more	   demo-­‐
cratic	   process	   and,	  
at	  the	  same	  time,	  a	  
more	   complex	  
task,	   as	   it	   has	   to	  
take	   into	   account	  
and	   balance	   interests	   and	  
sensitivities	   of	   a	   larger	   spectrum	   of	  
players.	  	  
The	   openings	   that	   the	   AKP	  
governments	   have	   made	   towards	  
the	  ethnic	  and	  religious	  minorities	  in	  
Turkey,	   the	   improvement	   of	  
relations	   with	   former	   “enemies”,	  
such	  as	  Syria,	  Iraq,	  Armenia,	  Greece,	  
Bulgaria,	   Russia,	   and	   Iran,	   their	  
[…]	  the	  improvement	  of	  
relations	  with	  former	  
“enemies”,	  such	  as	  Syria,	  Iraq,	  
Armenia,	  Greece,	  Bulgaria,	  
Russia,	  and	  Iran,	  their	  
forthcoming	  approach	  towards	  
solution	  on	  Cyprus	  in	  2004,	  and	  
in	  general,	  the	  effort	  to	  make	  
Turkey	  a	  factor	  of	  stability	  in	  
the	  region,	  all	  these	  instances	  
reflect	  a	  considerable	  degree	  of	  
democratization	  in	  the	  drafting	  
of	  Turkish	  foreign	  policy.	  
	  	  
	  

































forthcoming	   approach	   towards	  
solution	   on	   Cyprus	   in	   2004,	   and	   in	  
general,	  the	  effort	  to	  make	  Turkey	  a	  
factor	   of	   stability	   in	   the	   region,	   all	  
these	   instances	   reflect	   a	   conside-­‐
rable	   degree	   of	   democratization	   in	  
the	   drafting	   of	   Turkish	   foreign	  
policy.	  	  
A	   second	   change	   in	   Turkish	   foreign	  
policy,	   more	   relevant	   to	   the	   scope	  
of	   this	   paper,	   is	   connected	   with	   its	  
orientation.	  Up	  until	  the	  close	  of	  the	  
20th	   century,	   Turkish	   foreign	   policy	  
was	   dominated	   by	   the	   Sevres	  
syndrome,	   a	   heritage	   of	   the	  
disintegration	   of	   the	   Ottoman	  
Empire,	   reinvigorated	   by	   the	   Cold	  
War	   climate.	   Turkey	   was	   perceived	  
as	   being	   at	   a	   state	  
of	   siege	   by	   hostile	  
neighbors,	  even	  by	  
enemies	   from	  
within	   (i.e.	   the	  
ethnic	   and	  
religious	  minorities	  
and,	   later	   on,	   the	  
Turkish	   Islamic	  
movement).	   Even	  
Greece,	   a	   NATO	  
partner,	   had	   turned	   into	   an	   enemy	  
owing	  to	  the	  Cyprus	  crisis,	  which	  has	  
dominated	   Turkish-­‐Greek	   relations	  
since	   the	  1950s.	   	   In	  what	  Zorlu	  had	  
described	   as	   Turkey’s	   preemptive	  
defense	  against	  a	  Greek	  grip	  around	  
its	   Mediterranean	   harbors,	   Turkey	  
came	   out	   vehemently	   against	   the	  
Enosis	   Movement	   in	   an	   over-­‐
reaction	   that	   led	   to	   the	   pogrom	  
against	   the	   Greeks	   of	   Istanbul,	   and	  
culminated	   in	   the	   military	  
intervention	   in	  Cyprus	   in	  1974.	  This	  
“hard-­‐power”	  approach	  was	  still	  the	  
dominant	   trend	   when,	   in	   1996,	  
Şükrü	   Elektağ	   was	   pronouncing	   the	  
“two-­‐and-­‐a-­‐half	   wars”	   doctrine	   (i.e.	  
that	   Turkey	   should	   prepare	   to	   fight	  
two-­‐and-­‐a-­‐half	   wars	   simultaneously	  
against	  Greece,	  Syria,	  and	  the	  PKK).5	  	  	  
Things	   have	   changed	   dramatically	  
since	   then.	   First	   came	   the	  
“earthquake	   diplomacy”	   and	   the	  
Helsinki	  deal	  of	  1999,	  which	  led	  to	  a	  
warming	   up	   of	   Turkish-­‐Greek	  
relations	   while	   opening	   the	   way	   to	  
Turkey’s	   EU	   accession	   and	   reform	  
process.	   Then	   came	   the	   2002	  
landslide	   victory	   of	   Recep	   Tayyip	  
Erdoğan	   and	   his	  
“black	   Turks”	   or	  
“the	  other	  Turkey”,	  
as	   the	   Islamic	  
Movement	   was	  
seen	  by	  the	  Turkish	  
press	   following	   its	  
first	   electoral	  
victory	   in	   1994.6	   In	  
stark	   contrast	   to	  
the	   cases	   of	   Celal	  
Bayar	   and	   Süleyman	   Demirel,	  
Erdoğan	   and	   his	   “black”	   or	   “other”	  
Turks	   had	   been	   the	   outcasts	   of	   the	  
Kemalist	   establishment;	   they	   had	  
been	   kept	   entirely	   outside	   of	   the	  
political	   system.	   In	   this	   sense,	   the	  
ascent	  of	  the	  AKP	  to	  power	  meant	  a	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5	   Şükrü	   Elektağ:	   2	   ½	   War	   Strategy,	   Preceptions	  
Journal	   of	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[…]	  the	  ascent	  of	  the	  AKP	  to	  
power	  meant	  a	  second	  
Revolution	  (despite	  its	  being	  an	  
evolutionary	  process)	  in	  the	  
history	  of	  the	  Turkish	  Republic,	  
marking	  the	  beginning	  of	  the	  





































second	  Revolution	  (despite	  its	  being	  
an	   evolutionary	   process)	   in	   the	  
history	   of	   the	   Turkish	   Republic,	  
marking	  the	  beginning	  of	  the	  end	  of	  
the	   Kemalist	   statist	   authoritarian	  
regime.	   And	   it	   certainly	   meant	   the	  
end	  of	  the	  “hard-­‐power”	  dominated	  
policy	   both	   at	   home	   and	   abroad.	  
Since	   then,	   “soft-­‐power”	   win-­‐win	  
approach	   of	   Turkish	   foreign	   policy,	  
brilliantly	   expounded	   in	   Ahmet	  
Davutoğlu’s	   doctrine	   of	   “nil	  
problems	  with	  neighbors”,	  reflects	  a	  
feeling	   of	   self-­‐confidence	   and	  
security	   that	   helps	   transcend	  
obsessions	  of	  the	  past.	  	  	  	  
	  
The	   Cyprus	   Connection	   of	  
Erdoğan’s	  New	  Mandate	  
In	   the	   light	   of	   the	   above	   analysis,	  
Erdoğan’s	   third	   crashing	   election	  
victory	   of	   12	   June	   2011,	   and	  
renewal	   of	   mandate	   with	   a	   larger	  
ever	   popular	   support,	   beyond	   any	  
other	   intricate	   complexities,	   has	   to	  
be	   seen	   as	   the	   net	   result	   of	   a	  
growing	  social	  consensus	  for	  reform	  
and	   democratization	   at	   home,	   and	  
peace	   and	   stability	   abroad.	  
Regardless	   of	   whether	   Erdoğan	   has	  
a	   “hidden	   Islamic	   agenda”	   at	   the	  
back	  of	  his	  mind	  or	  not,	  what	  counts	  
in	   politics	   is	   not	   hidden	   thoughts	   –	  
or	  even	   intentions	  –	  of	   key	  players,	  
but	   political	   action	   and	   net	   result;	  
which	   is	   no	   longer	   determined	   by	  
one	   sole	   actor;	   which	   now	   is	   an	  
intricate	   process	   with	   a	   complex	  
network	   of	   social	   forces	   on	   the	  
stage.	   Even	   considering	   Max	  
Weber’s	   extended	   freedom	   of	  
action	   of	   charismatic	   leaders,	   this	  
presupposes	   a	   state	   of	   siege	   which	  
is	   not	   the	   case	   in	   present	   day	  
Turkey.	  	  	  	  
In	  this	  same	  light	  we	  have	  to	  set	  our	  
expectations	   of	   the	   new	   Turkish	  
government’s	  role	   in	  relation	  to	  the	  
protracted	   Cyprus	   conflict;	   taking	  
into	   account	   not	   public	   statements	  
which	  most	   frequently	   are	   directed	  
at	   multiple	   audiences	   and	   are	  
intended	   to	   serve	   multiple	   internal	  
purposes.	   A	   reliable	   evaluation	   of	  
solution	   perspectives	   should	   first	  
reside	   on	   a	   rational	   analysis	   of	   the	  
interests	   that	   solution	  would	   serve,	  
and,	  secondly,	  on	  an	  equally	  rational	  
analysis	   of	   the	   forces	   that	   move	  
history	   in	  the	  countries	   involved.	  As	  
for	   Turkey,	   to	   the	   extent	   that	   our	  
analysis	   is	   a	   valid	   interpretation	   of	  
reality,	   both	   broad	   interests	   and	  
history	   drivers	   converge	   toward	   a	  
peaceful	  settlement	  in	  Cyprus.	  	  	  
The	  Cyprus	  problem	  is	  no	  longer	  the	  
grand	  national	  issue	  that	  used	  to	  be	  
from	   Adnan	   Menderes	   to	   the	   last	  
days	  of	  Bülent	  Ecevit’s	  premiership.	  
What	   came	   out,	   during	   the	   recent	  
acrimonious	   exchanges	   between	  
Erdoğan	   and	   the	   Turkish	   Cypriots	  
was	   that	   for	   Erdoğan	   the	   Cyprus	  
problem	   is	   somehow	   a	   liability	  
which	  costs	  Turkey	  some	  one	  billion	  
euro	   a	   year.	   The	   very	   fact	   that	  
economic	   parameters	   are	   seriously	  
	  	  
	  

































accounted	   for	  and	  openly	  commen-­‐
ted	   on,	   is	   indicative	   of	   a	   rationali-­‐
zation	   which	   allows	   room	   for	  
negotiating	   a	   compromise	   solution.	  
The	   additional	   fact	   that	   the	   Cyprus	  
problem	  was	  almost	  completely	   left	  
out	  of	  the	  election	  campaign	  agenda	  
and	   that	   social	   research	   findings	  
showed	   considerable	   segments	   of	  
the	   Turkish	   society	   positively	  
inclined	   towards	   a	   compromise	  
federal	   solution	   while	   keeping	   the	  
issue	  low	  in	  their	  priorities,	   leaves	  a	  
free	   hand	   to	   the	  
new	   government	  
to	   take	   the	  
necessary	   initia-­‐
tives	   leading	   to	   an	  
agreed	  settlement.	  	  
Last	   but	   not	   least,	  
an	   early	   solution	  
on	   Cyprus	   would	  
have	   far	   reaching	  
positive	   effects	   on	  
Turkey’s	   EU	  
accession	   process.	  
Apart	   from	   freeing	  
the	   blocked	  
negotiation	  
chapters,	  it	  will	  set	  
the	   pace	   for	   a	   lasting	   negotiated	  
settlement	   of	   the	   disputes	   with	  
Greece,	   thus	  making	   the	   triangle	  of	  
Turkey,	   Greece,	   and	   Cyprus	   a	  
paradigm	   for	   peace,	   stability,	   and	  
cooperation	   in	   the	   turbulent	   region	  
of	   the	  Middle	   East,	   and	   a	   big	   asset	  
for	  the	  European	  Union.	  	  
One	  might	  argue,	  in	  this	  regard,	  that	  
the	   European	   ambivalence	   on	  
Turkey’s	   accession	   path	   relates	   to	  
more	   important	   considerations	  
which	   will	   not	   be	   removed	   once	  
there	   is	   a	   settlement	   on	   Cyprus	   or	  
even	  on	  the	  Turkish-­‐Greek	  disputes.	  
This	  argument	  is	  only	  partly	  true,	  as	  
it	   fails	   to	   account	   for	   the	   spillover	  
effect	   that	   such	   a	   momentous	  
development	   will	   have	   on	   the	  
European	  public	  opinion.	  Moreover,	  
neither	   Turkey	   nor	   the	   European	  
Union	   can	   oversee	  
the	   fact	   that	   more	  
than	   half	   of	  
Turkey’s	   trade	  
exchanges	  are	  with	  
EU	   countries	   and	  
that	   about	   two	  
thirds	   of	   foreign	  
investment	   in	  
Turkey	   come	   from	  
EU	  member	  states.	  	  
What	   is	   urgently	  
needed,	   which	   will	  
immensely	   help	  
towards	   a	   Cyprus	  
solution,	   is	  
revitalization	  of	  the	  
Helsinki	   spirit,	   I	   would	   say,	   a	   new	  
Helsinki	   deal,	   reconfirming	   Euro-­‐
pean	  will	   to	   accept	   Turkey	   as	   a	   full	  
member	   of	   the	   Union	   and	  
recommitting	  Turkey	  to	  work	  consis-­‐
tently	   in	   the	   direction	   of	   fulfilling	  
the	   Copenhagen	   accession	   criteria.	  
Turkey’s	   unprecedented	   economic	  
performance	   is	   an	   additional	   asset	  
The	  additional	  fact	  that	  the	  
Cyprus	  problem	  was	  almost	  
completely	  left	  out	  of	  the	  
election	  campaign	  agenda	  and	  
that	  social	  research	  findings	  
showed	  considerable	  segments	  
of	  the	  Turkish	  society	  positively	  
inclined	  towards	  a	  compromise	  
federal	  solution	  while	  keeping	  
the	  issue	  low	  in	  their	  priorities,	  
leaves	  a	  free	  hand	  to	  the	  new	  
government	  to	  take	  the	  
necessary	  initiatives	  leading	  to	  
an	  agreed	  settlement.	  
	  	  
	  

































that	   sets	   aside	   quite	   a	   lot	   of	   crisis-­‐
connected	  European	  fears.	  	  
Recommendations	  
To	  put	  the	  record	  straight,	  what	  are	  
the	   practical	   steps	   that	   one	   might	  
expect	   Turkey	   to	   take,	   now	   that	   it	  
has	   a	   government	   with	   a	   new	  
mandate	  and	  a	  free	  hand,	  one	  might	  
say,	   to	   reach	   a	   compromise	  
settlement	  on	  Cyprus? 
I	  would	  suggest	  the	  following	  points	  
as	  food	  for	  thought:	  
1. Turkey	   should	   dispel	   Greek	  
Cypriot	   fears	   that	   it	   perceives	  
solution	   in	   terms	   of	   power	  
politics.	  It	  needs	  to	  convince	  that	  
the	   doctrine	   of	   “nil	   problems	  
with	   neighbors”	   could	   be	  
applicable	   in	  Cyprus	  as	  well	  on	  a	  
win-­‐win	  basis.	  
2. Turkey	   should	   also	   dispel	   Greek	  
Cypriot	   fears,	   which	   loomed	  
large	   in	   the	   run	   up	   to	   the	  
referendum	   of	   24	   April	   2004,	  
that	   while	   they	   would	  
immediately	   give	   power	   sharing,	  
what	   they	   would	   get	   back	   in	  
return,	   which	   was	   territory	   and	  
properties,	  would	  be	  too	  slow	  to	  
come,	   in	   exceedingly	   long	  
timeframes	  that	  made	  it	   look	  far	  
remote	  and	  uncertain.	  	  
3. Drastic	  shortening	  of	  timeframes	  
should	   particularly	   apply	   to	   the	  
withdrawal	   of	   Turkish	   troops	  
from	  the	   island.	  The	  provision	   in	  
the	  Annan	  Plan	  for	  the	  stationing	  
of	   a	   6000-­‐strong	   Turkish	   con-­‐
tingent	   for	   seven	  years	  after	   the	  
implementation	   of	   the	   agree-­‐
ment	   and	   for	   a	   3000-­‐strong	   one	  
for	   another	   seven-­‐year	   period	  
could	   not	   be	   legitimized	   in	   the	  
minds	   of	   the	   people	   as	  
reasonable	  or	  necessary.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4. As	   timeframes,	   particularly	   on	  
the	   return	   of	   land	   and	  
properties,	   would	   be	   necessary	  
to	   give	   time	   for	   relocation	   of	  
Turkish	   Cypriots,	   Turkey	   should	  
show	   readiness	   to	   accept	   such	  
guarantees	   of	   the	   implement-­‐
tation	  of	  the	  agreement	  to	  be,	  so	  
that	  to	  dispel	  any	  fears	  that	  it	  will	  
not	  keep	  its	  commitments.	  
5. While	   Greek	   Cypriots	   should	  
accept	  such	  arrangements	  on	  the	  
property	   issue	   that	   would	  
address	   the	   will	   of	   the	   vast	  
majority	   of	   the	   Turkish	   Cypriots	  
to	  live	  in	  a	  compact	  area,	  as	  well	  
as	   practical	   needs	   within	   the	  
agreed	   upon	   federal	   framework,	  
Turkey	   should	   convince	   the	  
Turkish	   Cypriot	   negotiators	   not	  
to	   insist	   on	   arrangements	   that	  
stink	  of	  ethnic	  cleansing.	   I	  would	  
recall,	   in	   this	   regard,	   the	  
principles	   underlying	   the	   Cyprus	  
Academic	   Dialogue	   Property	  
Proposals,	   which,	   while	   allowing	  
for	   Turkish	   Cypriot	   majority	   of	  
population	   and	   land	   ownership	  
in	  the	  Turkish	  Cypriot	  constituent	  
state	   to	   be,	   give	   priority	   to	  
	  	  
	  

































humanitarian	   criteria	   and	  
suggest	  arrangements	  that	  would	  
allow,	   and	   even	   encourage,	  
gradual	   social	   and	   economic	  
interaction	  among	  citizens	  of	  the	  
two	  communities.7	  	  
6. If	   the	   motto	   of	   a	   settlement	   is	  
“power	  sharing	   for	  peace”	  as	   far	  
as	  Greek	  Cypriots	  are	  concerned,	  
“land	   for	   peace”	   should	   be	   the	  
motto	   for	   Turkey,	   which	   should	  
show	   readiness	   to	   accept	   such	  
arrangements	   that	   would	   allow	  
the	   return	   of	   substantial	   num-­‐
bers	  of	  Greek	  Cypriot	  refugees	  to	  
their	   homes	   and	   lands.	   Linking	  
the	   issues	   of	   “territory”	   and	  
“property”	   we	   might	   set	   a	  
balancing	  rule	  whereby	  the	  more	  
the	   land	   to	   be	   returned	   under	  
Greek	  Cypriot	  administration,	  the	  
higher	   the	  percentage	  of	  Turkish	  
Cypriot	   land	   ownership	   in	   the	  
Turkish	  Cypriot	  constituent	  state.	  	  	  
7. With	  regard	  to	  the	  security	  issue,	  
the	   Turkish	   government	   should	  
show	   readiness	   to	   accept	   such	  
arrangements	   that	   would	  
address	   the	   “double	   minority	  
concerns”	   in	   Cyprus,	   that	   is,	   the	  
Turkish	  Cypriot	  concern	  for	  being	  
a	   minority	   in	   Cyprus	   and	   the	  
Greek	   Cypriot	   concern	   for	   being	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7	  Cyprus	  Academic	  Dialogue	  is	  a	  bicommunal	  forum	  
established	   in	   2010	   by	   Greek	   and	   Turkish	   Cypriot	  
academics	  and	  intellectuals.	  Its	  Property	  Proposals	  
were	   submitted	   to	   party	   leaders	   of	   the	   two	  
communities	  and	  the	  negotiators	  as	  well	  as	  the	  UN	  
and	  the	  EU	  representatives	  in	  Cyprus	  before	  being	  
released	  to	  the	  press	  last	  February.	  	  	  
a	   minority	   vis-­‐à-­‐vis	   the	   over-­‐
populous	   and	   overpowering	  
Turkish	  mainland.	  
8. This	   would	   entail,	   at	   first	   hand,	  
Turkey’s	   unequivocal	   commit-­‐
ment	   to	   withdraw	   Turkish	  
military	   forces	   the	   presence	   of	  
which	  in	  Cyprus	  is	  not	  covered	  by	  
international	  treaties.	  	  
9. It	   would	   also	   entail	   a	  
commitment	   to	  withdraw,	  under	  
agreed	   upon	   arrangements	   and	  
incentives,	   a	   substantial	   number	  
of	   Turkish	   citizens	   who	   have	  
settled	   in	   the	   northern	   part	   of	  
Cyprus,	   the	   presence	   of	   whom	  
on	  the	  island	  dramatically	  upsets	  
demographic	   structures,	   while	  
constituting	  a	  burden	  on	  cultural	  
identities	  and	  social	  stability.	  
10. Turkey	  should	  show	  readiness	  to	  
reconsider	   the	   1960	   guarantees,	  
in	   the	   light	   of	   the	   European	  
framework	   and	   of	  Greek	   Cypriot	  
concerns	   at	   the	   possibility	   of	  
unilateral	  intervention.	  
11. In	   the	   face	   of	   the	   disquietingly	  
slow	   pace	   of	   the	   Cyprus	   peace	  
talks	   between	   the	   two	   leaders,	  
Erdoğan	   might	   bring	   back	   his	  
proposal	   for	   broadening	   the	  
negotiation	   procedure	   (with	   the	  
participation	   of	   Turkey,	   Greece,	  
and	   the	  EU).	  Having	  pronounced	  
the	   measures	   noted	   above	   and	  
having	   thus	   established	   the	  
necessary	   trust,	   he	   might	   help	  
settle	   stalled	   issues	   on	   the	   spot	  
	  	  
	  

































in	   unison	   with	   the	   two	  
community	   leaders,	   the	   UN	   and	  
the	   EU.	   The	   spillover	   effect	   of	  
such	   a	   statesmanlike	   initiative	   is	  
so	   self-­‐evident	   that	   it	   does	   not	  
need	  to	  be	  elaborated	  on.	  	  
	  
Concluding	  Remarks	  	  
Considering	   the	   current	   negative	  
political	   atmosphere	   in	   large	  
segments	   of	   the	   Greek	   Cypriot	  
community,	  one	  might	  retort:	  “Well,	  
why	   should	   Turkey	   take	   all	   these	  
steps	   while	   there	   is	   little	   or	   no	  
chance	   of	   Greek	   Cypriot	   recipro-­‐
cation?”	  	  
The	   answer	   is:	  
“There	  is”.	  
Those	   Greek	  
Cypriots	   who	   are	  
now	   refusing	   basic	  
power-­‐sharing	  
principles	   and	   are	  
insisting	   on	  
absolute	   legalistic	  
approaches	   on	   the	  
issues	  of	  governan-­‐
ce,	   property,	   and	  
the	   settlers,	   are	  
among	   those	   who	   overwhelmingly	  
endorsed	   Christofias’	   handlings	   of	  
the	  peace	  talks	  as	  long	  as	  those	  talks	  
kept	   the	   solution	   prospect	   alive.	  
Failure	   of	   Christofias	   and	   Talat	   to	  
deliver,	   regardless	   of	   who	   was	   to	  
blame,	   pushed	   large	   segments	   of	   a	  
desperate	  Greek	  Cypriot	  community	  
back	  to	  simplistic	  reflexive	  attitudes	  
according	   to	   which	   “Turkish	  
intransigence”	   was	   behind	   the	  
deadlock.	   Failure	   of	   the	   leaders	   to	  
deliver	   played	   the	   fiddle	   of	  
nationalism,	   a	   new	  brand	  of	   Cypro-­‐
centric	   ethnic	   nationalism	   which	  
emerged	  with	   Tassos	  Papadopoulos	  
and	  makes	  its	  come-­‐backs	  whenever	  
solution	   perspectives	   fade	   out.	   This	  
is	   why	   a	   Turkish	   positive	   initiative	  
that	   might	   bring	   back	   hope	   might	  
turn	   things	   upside	   down	   in	   the	  
Greek	  Cypriot	  community	  and	  make	  
its	  leadership	  reciprocate.	  	  	  	  
Concluding,	   I	   feel	   the	  need	   to	  point	  
out	   that	   Greek	   Cypriots	   have	   to	  
become	   aware	   that	   they	   will	   never	  
reach	   solution	   in	   an	   open	  
confrontationist	  
antagonism	   with	  
Turkey,	   or	   with	  
public	   lecturing	   on	  
justice	   confined	   to	  
internal	   audiences,	  
or	   even	   with	  
recourses	   to	   inter-­‐
national	   legal	   fo-­‐
rums,	   a	   practice	  
that	   has	   already	  
backtracked.	  
A	   conciliatory	   gesture	   by	   the	  
Erdoğan	   government,	   at	   this	  
particular	   juncture,	   will	   pass	   the	  
message	   to	   the	  Greek	  Cypriots	   that	  
they	   can	   reach	   a	   settlement	   by	  
coming	   to	   an	   understanding	   with	  
Turkey	   through	   direct	   dialogue	   in	   a	  
broadened	  negotiating	  procedure,	  	  
[…]	  Greek	  Cypriots	  have	  to	  
become	  aware	  that	  they	  will	  
never	  reach	  solution	  in	  an	  open	  
confrontationist	  antagonism	  
with	  Turkey,	  or	  with	  public	  
lecturing	  on	  justice	  confined	  to	  
internal	  audiences,	  or	  even	  with	  
recourses	  to	  international	  legal	  





































It	  is	  high	  time	  Cyprus	  got	  reconciled	  
with	   its	   Geography;	   certainly	   not	  
through	  submission	  to	  the	  dominant	  
power	   of	   the	   region;	   but	   through	   a	  
balanced	   cooperation	   based	   on	  
mutual	   benefits,	   and	   through	  
safeguarding	   to	   both	   Greek	   and	  
Turkish	   Cypriots	   the	   conditions	   to	  
live	   peacefully	   as	   autonomous	  
historical	  and	  cultural	  entities.	  
The	   European	   framework,	   within	  
which	   Cyprus	   has	   already	   been	  
functioning	   and	   towards	   which	  
Turkey	   is	   aspiring,	   provides	   all	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